John King
January 2009

POLITICAL ECONOMY
RESEARCH INSTITUTE

Social Democratic and Socialist Policies

Gordon Hall
418 North Pleasant Street
Amherst, MA 01002
Phone: 413.545.6355
Fax: 413.577.0261
peri@econs.umass.edu
www.peri.umass.edu

WORKINGPAPER SERIES
Number 191

Social Democratic and Socialist Policies
J.E. King
Definitions
Socialism is best defined very broadly, as the doctrine that capitalism has very
serious problems, and that a substantial degree of public ownership is needed to solve
them. On this definition, ‘socialism’ would include Marxists, Fabians, Utopians,
Anarcho-Communists and even conservative (Bismarckian) State Socialists. Social
democracy is an even more slippery term. In the late nineteenth century it was used
by socialists of many persuasions, often but not always Marxist or Marxistinfluenced, to express the conviction that society and the economy, as well as the
polity, must be democratised. This was not seen as inconsistent either with the
achievement of socialism through revolution, or even with a period of dictatorship
after the revolution: in Russia, for example, the full name of the Bolshevik party was
the RSDLP(B), or Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (Bolshevik).
After 1917, however, ‘social democracy’ was increasingly used to distinguish
non-revolutionary or ‘reformist’ socialists from their bitter rivals in the international
Communist movement. From 1945, it also came to connote a major revision of
traditional socialist orthodoxy, involving a new commitment to a ‘mixed’ economy
in which a large private sector would remain as a permanent feature. In the early
1980s the term ‘social democratic’ was appropriated by a right-wing breakaway from
the (already very conservative) Labour Party in Britain, but by the end of the century
it had fallen into disuse. It is best thought of today as characterising the economic
policies that had been endorsed by non-Communist socialists in and out of ‘Labour’,
‘Socialist’ and (in some countries) ‘Social Democratic’ parties, especially in Western
Europe and Australasia, down to about 1980. On this definition, few if any centre-left
parties are now socialist or social democratic, and, arguably, the Democratic Party in
the US never has been. However, socialist and social democratic ideas are not dead.
They continue to inspire Green parties around the world, though neoliberal thinking
is increasingly in the ascendant there, too. They certainly resonate strongly in the
global justice movement that erupted in the late 1990s, albeit radically altered to
incorporate the so-called ‘new social movements’ (especially feminism), questions of
environmental sustainability, and the global nature of the capitalist market.
In the remainder of this entry, the term ‘socialist’ will be used in a very broad
sense to denote both social democratic and socialist ideas. For a general historical
discussion, see King (2003b), Lichtheim (1983) and Sassoon (1996).
In The Beginning
The most famous statement of socialist principles was written in 1847 by Friedrich
Engels and Karl Marx. The Communist Manifesto emphasises the revolutionary and
universal character of the capitalist system, which is inherently cosmopolitan and
cannot avoid dissolving the national basis of production and exchange: ‘It compels

all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production’ (Marx
and Engels 1998:244). It sets out a transitional programme for the working-class
movement. The details would differ in different countries, Marx and Engels
suggested, but the broad outlines were ‘pretty generally applicable’ throughout the
world. Their demands included the abolition of private property in land; a heavy
progressive income tax; abolition of the right of inheritance; centralisation of credit,
and of the means of communication and transport, in the hands of the state; an
extension of factories and instruments of production owned by the state; a universal
obligation to work; and free education for all children in public schools (pp. 257-8).
In the Communist Manifesto it is taken for granted that the interests of working
people are everywhere the same, and the concluding lines are intended as much more
than mere rhetoric: ‘The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have
a world to win. Workingmen of all countries, unite!’ (p. 268).
Half a century later, the Erfurt Programme of the Social Democratic Party in
imperial Germany repeated these claims (Russell 1965:137-41). The global
dimension was explicitly recognised. The proletariat faced the same problems, and
had the same interests, in all capitalist countries. ‘The liberation of the working class,
accordingly, is a work in which the workmen of all civilised countries are equally
involved’, and the party therefore declared itself to be ‘one with the class-conscious
workmen of all other countries’ (p.139; original emphasis). The detailed programme
that followed included a demand for ‘national and international legislation’ to
establish a maximum eight-hour day, to prohibit night work and child labour, and to
guarantee at least 36 hours of unbroken rest for all workers each week (p. 141).
Bertrand Russell commented at the time on the ‘perfectly orthodox Marxianism’ of
the Erfurt Programme, ‘and its boundless democracy’ (p. 141). He might also have
noted its moderation, and its global reach.
In the late 1890s, the ‘revisionist’ opponents of orthodox German Marxism
argued that a proletarian revolution was both undesirable and unlikely to occur.
Socialists ought therefore to be satisfied with the progressive, but peaceful,
piecemeal and gradual, achievement of economic and social reform. In Britain the
Fabian socialists took a very similar position. In both cases, however, the cumulative
effect of reforms was expected to be a fundamentally different social order (Webb
and Webb 1920). The combined effect of the Great Depression and the (apparent)
success of Stalin’s industrialization of the Soviet Union radicalised Western
socialists in the 1930s, temporarily increasing the appeal of a centrally planned
economy under full public ownership. After 1945, however, a new revisionist current
emerged, arguing that the socialist project must be adapted to take account of major
changes that had occurred in the nature of capitalism. Some revisionists, like
Anthony Crosland, even claimed that postwar Britain could no longer be described as
capitalist. In The Future of Socialism (1956) he argued that ownership of the means
of production was irrelevant, since large companies were now controlled by
managers, not by shareholders, and the distribution of income depended more on
politics (including taxation and government spending policies) than on market forces.

For Crosland socialism was all about equality, not nationalisation. It is striking just
how few references there are, in Crosland’s 529-page book, to either finance or the
world economy. He worries a little about the balance of payments (Crosland
1956:380-1), and expresses the hope that banks will lend more to industry (p.437-8),
but that is about all: there are no references in the index to colonies, development,
finance, international (anything), trade, world poverty or the World Bank. For
Crosland, socialism was essentially a local matter, without significant global
implications.
The Neoliberal Age
This made sense only on the assumptions, firstly that the capitalist tiger had been
tamed, so that the system had moved very much closer to socialism, and secondly
that these changes were irreversible. Both proved to be false. In fairness to Crosland
and his ilk, it should be stressed that the neoliberal revolution that swept the globe
after 1975 took everyone by surprise (Howard & King 2008). The neoliberals
asserted that all social problems had a market solution, with deregulation and
privatisation as corollaries. Financial markets, in particular, were to resume their pre1929 importance, not actually to provide finance to companies (which still relied
very largely on retained profits) but rather to ensure the maximisation of ‘shareholder
value’ and to provide a market for corporate control.
All this was set in the context of a renewed capitalist globalisation, which should
be seen not as an unavoidable Act of God but rather as a project (Quiggin 2001),
reflected in the so-called Washington Consensus propagated by the IMF, the World
Bank, the GATT (and its successor, the WTO) and by the US Treasury. Poor
countries, especially, should rely upon free trade, unrestricted mobility of capital,
free markets, sound finance, low taxes and a small public sector to achieve rapid
economic development; and the rich countries would benefit from ‘the magic of the
market’, too. The upshot was the steady dismantling of the post-1945 settlement by
means of privatisation, cuts in welfare spending, big reductions in taxes on
corporations and rich individuals, the lifting of restrictions on financial markets, and
far-reaching attacks on labour market regulation and the power of trade unions. All
this means that socialist and social democratic policy now has an unavoidably
reactionary flavour, since its principal aim is to reverse the damage done by the
neoliberals.
But it is not purely nostalgic. Indeed, it has been given added impetus by the
global financial crisis of 2008. To cite one recent example, the crisis has prompted a
statement by twenty prominent heterodox economists that includes demands for
macroeconomic stabilisation, social justice, environmental sustainability and
international coordination of national recovery programmes. All would be
recognizable to, and endorsed by, socialists and social democrats of earlier
generations (Ash et al. 2009).
Public Ownership

At least seven socialist arguments for public ownership can be distinguished. First, it
is a necessary first step in the total transformation of society. Second, much more
modestly, it enables particular industries to be run more efficiently. Third,
monopolies should be in public ownership to prevent exploitation of consumers.
Fourth, public ownership is needed to produce a more equal distribution of wealth
(and this, in turn, is a pre-condition for real political democracy; the alternative is
rule by the rich). Fifth, it is essential for macroeconomic stabilization, as only then
can investment expenditure be varied to offset cyclical fluctuations in economic
activity. Sixth, in industries producing demerit goods like tobacco and gambling,
public ownership is the only way to give managers an incentive to restrict consumer
demand. Seventh, large numbers of public sector jobs are needed if full employment
is to be maintained.
The first argument is rejected by revisionist social democrats, and many other
socialists now accept continuing private ownership of small business and actively
encourage the growth of self-managed worker cooperatives (Nove 1983). Antisocialists have always maintained that the other six objectives can be attained in
other ways, by a combination of competition, regulation and taxation. These
objections have some merit, but they completely fail to meet the macroeconomic
case for public ownership (arguments five and seven) and ignore the political issues
raised by regulatory capture and tax avoidance (which are related to arguments three
and six).
The most interesting questions are those arising from the fourth argument. If
highly progressive income, wealth and inheritance taxes can be imposed, and do
generate a drastic reduction in the degree of inequality of wealth without oldfashioned ‘nationalization’ of the means of production, distribution and exchange,
what sort of economy─and society─would this create? An egalitarian capitalism,
along the lines of the ‘property-owning democracy’ that progressive conservatives
have always claimed to support? Or a decentralized collectivism, with the great bulk
of shares held by pension funds (Blackburn 2002) or union-controlled mutual funds
(Arestis 1986)? Would there still be financial markets in such a system? How would
they be regulated in the social interest? And how would such a pattern of ownership,
and the corresponding system of regulation, be made consistent with the (often
conflicting) demands of narrow economic efficiency and the broader concerns of
social justice and environmental sustainability? Socialists still have a lot of thinking
to do on all these questions.
One further socialist argument for public ownership deserves a mention. If there
are binding political constraints on the amount that can be raised through taxation of
corporate profits, public share ownership may be the only way in which society can
obtain an acceptable proportion of total output (Quiggin 2001). On this argument, the
privatization of highly profitable telecom enterprises (for example) was a mistake,
whatever the merits of the efficiency, monopoly and macroeconomic arguments for
their retention in public hands.

A final issue is especially relevant to socialism in the Third World, and this is
land reform. Where the majority─or a very large minority─of the working
population are peasant farmers, the distribution of landed wealth is a critically
important question. Socialists in Asia and Latin America therefore insist on the need
to break up large estates and provide land to landless farmers, with an urgency
unparalleled in Europe since the late nineteenth century.
Macroeconomic Stability
For socialists, full employment should be the over-riding goal of macroeconomic
policy. This entails what Abba Lerner referred to in the 1940s as ‘functional finance’,
that is, tax and expenditure policy geared to achieving the full employment level of
output, whatever the implications for public finances. If deficits (even large deficits)
are required, so be it (Nevile 2003). But government deficits should be seen as at
least in part, as an endogenous response to a collection of private sector decisions
which in aggregate imply a private sector surplus. This points to the need to
encourage private sector spending (Reynolds 2004), in particular by keeping interest
rates low. Democratic control over monetary policy must therefore be re-established,
with central banks coming back under parliamentary supervision and full
employment replacing inflation as their chief priority. Central banks should target
employment growth, subject to an inflation constraint This is particularly important
in developing countries like South Africa, where unemployment, open and
concealed, is chronically at levels experienced in the rich countries only during the
Great Depression. Here job creation is, literally, a matter of life and death (Pollin et
al. 2007).
This has two implications. In the long run, output must grow at the (Harrod)
natural rate, which is the rate that gives a constant unemployment percentage. In the
short run a higher rate of growth will be needed to reduce unemployment to the
maximum acceptable, or full employment, level, which in the rich countries might be
as low as 2%. This initial period of very rapid output growth raises the very real
prospect of a conflict with environmental objectives, which require restrictions on the
rate of growth of consumption. Environmental concerns aside, there will be an
inflation constraint on the achievement of full employment, and in all likelihood a
balance of payments constraint too. To overcome the inflation constraint, many
socialists accept the need for an incomes policy, with an explicit commitment to
maintaining (or perhaps increasing) the wage and salary share of GDP. Price and
wage controls would be required, with a presumption that both wage-push and profitpush inflation are potentially important problems.
Balance of payments constraints can be dealt with in the long run through reform
of the international financial system (Davidson 2008), and in the short run by reregulation of financial markets and (where necessary) temporary increases in tariffs.
An internationally-coordinated demand expansion would overcome the balance of
payments constraint on individual national economies. It would almost certainly
make the inflation constraint more serious, however, since the inelastic supply of

primary products renders commodity prices sensitive to any significant increase in
world demand, as became apparent in 2007 and the early months of 2008. Ussher
(2009) draws on the work of Nicholas Kaldor to advocate a return to the commodity
price stabilization schemes that operated with some success in the 1950s and 1960s,
relying on internationally-administered buffer stocks (see also King 2009). This
would benefit producers as well as consumers by preventing catastrophic price
collapses like those suffered by cocoa and coffee producers in the late 1990s, and oil
producers in the final months of 2008.
Sensible macroeconomic policies must be supplemented by compatible
microeconomic action, including detailed intervention in financial markets to
regulate the allocation of credit. One relevant proposal is for the introduction of
differential reserve requirements, favouring employment-generating investment at
the expense of speculation. Asset-based reserve requirements would also allow some
control of asset price bubbles (Palley 2004).
Social Justice
A return to full employment would be the single most important contribution to
social justice that economic policy could make. This almost certainly involves
substantial public employment programmes, with the government acting as employer
of last resort, offering jobs to all who are willing to work and unable to find private
sector employment. Socialists would expect those employed in this way to receive
union-negotiated wage rates appropriate to their skills. More conservative proponents
of the ‘job guarantee’ would offer only minimum wages (Wray 1998).
Improvements to social welfare also involve continued public provision of
pensions and other income maintenance payments, and the supply of much greater
quantities of public goods like health care, education and child care by not-for-profit
institutions that are subject to democratic supervision and control. There must also be
a firm commitment to gender/ethnicity equality and the reversal of environmental
decay (which affects the poor more than the rich). Productive public investment in
these and similar fields would stimulate private investment in related activities,
leading to ‘crowding in’ rather than to the conservative bugbear of ‘crowding out’.
Socialists also support re-regulation of the labour market to reduce inequality in
employment incomes, restrict hours of work and encourage industrial democracy.
They are natural allies of trade unions and supporters of collective bargaining, but
recognise that there are increasingly severe limits to what can be achieved through
bargaining by weak unions, and a corresponding need for political intervention to
enforce the payment of a living wage (Pollin et al. 2008) and employer acceptance of
reasonable constraints on working hours. This could be widened to include a much
broader demand for industrial democracy. Co-determination has proved sufficiently
unpopular with German business to suggest that there might well be something in it
for labour, especially if it is combined with an interventionist industry policy giving
employees some control over corporate investment decisions. The 1980s Swedish
proposal for wage-earner funds─a form of collective profit-sharing with substantial

union involvement─also deserves reconsideration as a means of reducing inequalities
in income and wealth without exposing working people to excessive levels of
financial risk (Arestis 1986). An alternative is employee ownership of the individual
enterprise, which would greatly reduce the need for supervision and monitoring of
the workforce and therefore significantly increase labour productivity (Bowles and
Gintis 1998). This, however, is open to the powerful objection that working people
cannot afford to have all their limited financial eggs in one fragile basket.
Statutory limitations on excessive working hours have already been imposed in
the European Union, and they have been effective, up to a point. They should be
supplemented by measures to reverse the pressures of workplace culture that
contribute to the acceptance of overwork by those who suffer most from it, including
family-friendly policies that encourage parents to spend more time with their young
children. The restoration of full employment will make this easier, as it will
substantially increase the bargaining power of labour (unionised or not) at the
expense of capital.
One longstanding proposal with impeccable socialist credentials (Russell 1918;
Meade 1989) is the payment of an unconditional Basic or Citizens’ Income, financed
by progressive taxation. Since it offers an alternative source of income to paid
employment, Basic Income has a number of important advantages. It would value the
work of carers (who are mostly women), and encourage leisure and voluntary work
at the expense of consumption. It would, however, be extremely expensive,
especially if set at a level significantly above the bare requirements for subsistence,
in which case it would probably have a significant impact on work incentives (and
corresponding environmental benefits in reducing the full employment or natural rate
of growth of output). A more conservative version of Basic Income would pay it only
to those actively engaged in socially desirable non-market activities, including the
care of young children or elderly relatives.
Tax Reform
Increased public expenditure will place pressure on government finances, so that tax
reform is important. Uncontroversially, this must include better enforcement of the
existing system (closing loopholes and attacking tax havens). It will also require the
‘green taxes’ detailed below and substantial taxation of wealth, especially (but not
exclusively) inherited wealth. Taxes on land should be substantially increased, and a
case can also be made for the replacement of taxes on income by a progressive
expenditure tax along the lines suggested many years ago by Nicholas Kaldor (1955).
There is an urgent need to eliminate tax competition between nation-states, which
generates a fiscal ‘race to the bottom’ and reduces the revenue-raising potential of
them all. Thus tax policy has an inescapable global dimension. This is acknowledged
by the many socialists who campaign for the introduction of a financial transactions
tax, either restricted to foreign exchange dealings, the so-called Tobin tax (Patomäki
2001), or a more general tax on all financial transactions. Patomäki argues that the
technical difficulties of implementing the Tobin tax are often exaggerated. In

particular, it does not require unanimous international endorsement, but could
initially be introduced by a grouping of states, such as the European Union, with
other national governments joining the proposed TTO (Tobin Tax Organisation) at a
later date. Since the tax is unlikely to eliminate currency speculation altogether, this
offers the prospect of very significant increases in government revenue (see
Davidson 2002:ch 12, for some objections).
Environmental Sustainability
Socialists are less sharply divided from conservatives and liberals on environmental
questions than on any of the other issues. The fundamental neoclassical principle of
scarcity does after all apply to nature, whereas it is relevant to labour only in wartime
and no-one has ever been able to make analytical sense of the notion of ‘scarcity of
capital’. Most non-socialist economists will agree that the internalisation of
environmental externalities has not gone very far; that the Coase theorem is almost
entirely useless as a solution to global warming; and that some elaborate combination
of regulation, taxation and subsidies will be necessary to bring marginal private costs
much closer to marginal social costs, and marginal private benefits much closer to
marginal social benefits, than they are at present (Pearce 1993).
There is thus a very strong case for a redefinition of total output, replacing (or at
least supplementing) GDP with measures reflecting environmental goods, leisure,
non-market and voluntary work. Many socialists would go further, urging a reduction
in the level of consumption in the rich countries of the world and a corresponding
repudiation of the consumerist ethic that dominates them (Victor and Rosenbluth
2007). They would also endorse a fundamental reform of the taxation system to tax
environmentally damaging activities: the carbon tax is the best-known proposal, with
salination and water use taxes not far behind. But socialists place less emphasis on
taxation, and more on direct regulation, given their well-founded objections to the
neoclassical analysis of substitution in consumption and production. There are also
sound reasons for rejecting market prices as indices of scarcity, again contributing to
socialist scepticism concerning market-based solutions to environmental problems
(Winnett 2003). Tinkering with the price mechanism is unlikely to be sufficient; a
more fundamental change in human behaviour, values and styles of life may well be
necessary to protect the environment in the longer term.
Socialists are, however, divided on the merits of a steady-state economy (zero
growth) as a medium- or long-term goal. At least for poor countries, a substantial
period of rapid growth seems essential in order to secure a decent life for the great
majority of the population; redistribution from rich to poor is necessary, but not in
any way sufficient. Assuming for the moment that eliminating growth is desirable,
there are two potentially very serious problems. In the short- to medium-term, there
is the previously-noted difficulty of reconciling zero growth with full employment. In
the long run, if productivity growth is a function of output growth then accepting a
steady-state economy might require us to renounce dynamic economies of scale,
posing problems for international competitiveness and worsening the balance of

payments constraint on employment policy in any individual country.
‘Environmental responsibility in one country’ may therefore be impracticable for
narrowly economic reasons alone, quite apart from the global nature of ecological
systems.
International Responsibility
Socialists see an urgent need to reform international economic institutions to make
them democratically accountable and remove their pro-corporation, deflationary,
neoliberal biases. In the case of the IMF, World Bank and WTO this may well
require their closure and replacement by entirely new institutions capable of making
an entirely fresh start. At the very least, the lending advice and conditionality
imposed by the IMF must be changed, and global counter-cyclical policy promoted
(Ash et al. 2009). Opposition to any extension of the WTO’s General Agreement on
Trade in Services is also essential if social welfare provisions are to be protected.
Socialists also call for re-regulation of international financial markets, and many
would welcome a return to fixed exchange rates and (perhaps) the restriction of all
foreign exchange transactions to central banks (as proposed by Davidson 2002).
Short of this, Patomäki proposes a two-tiered Tobin tax, with the higher rate
automatically applying in periods of increased currency volatility to dampen the
incentive for further speculation.
A number of more contentious suggestions will require further discussion. Among
the most divisive is the question of alternatives to free trade that could protect the
interests of low-income groups in both the rich and the poor countries. Socialists in
the Third World agree with liberal internationalists in the West that the subsidies
paid to farmers in the US and the European Union have had devastating
consequences for peasant agriculture in poor countries, and should be eliminated in
the interests of global justice. Western socialists accept the underlying indictment,
but might have worries about the implications for small farmers, and low-income
rural communities, in the West.
Sharper divisions arise on the question of trade in manufactures and, increasingly,
in services, where the interests of the working class in (for example) Western Europe
and China are very difficult to reconcile. Thomas Palley distinguishes trade between
countries with similar wage levels and socioeconomic systems (‘developeddeveloped free trade’) from trade between countries where both wage levels and
socioeconomic systems are radically different (‘developed-underdeveloped free
trade’). The latter, he argues, does not necessarily benefit working people in the more
developed country: ‘In effect, free trade serves to unify the labor markets of
developed and under-developed countries, and this puts strong downward pressure
on wages in the developed country. … In this fashion, free trade worsens income
distribution’ (Palley 1998:166). It also reduces workers’ bargaining power,
undermining the socioeconomic structure and encouraging a further ‘race to the
bottom’ in employment standards. Palley suggests that a ‘social tariff’ might be
imposed ‘to compensate for low wages and lack of commitment to social goals

regarding the environment, worker health and safety, and social welfare’. The
revenue might then be redistributed back to the developing countries (Palley
1998:171).
Palley’s proposals for the avoidance of ‘social dumping’ reflect what Graham
Dunkley has termed the ‘Fair Trade’ alternative to free trade. Significantly, Palley
does not endorse the more radical, ‘unit cost equalisation’, variant of Fair Trade,
‘based on the specification of minimum wages and conditions, though not actual
wage rates, the aim being to minimise international “unit cost gaps” as calculated on
the basis of relative productivity and real wage rates’ (Dunkley 1997:252). The
problem with this, of course, is the impact on employment opportunities in the poor
countries. Huge issues arise here concerning the conflict of interest between workers
in rich and poor countries: the latter would gain if free trade were in effect to create a
single unified global labour market, while the latter would lose, and lose disastrously.
A Rawlsian would therefore be inclined to favour free trade, but almost no-one in the
rich countries is a Rawlsian at the global level. For very similar reasons, none but the
very rich favour uncontrolled immigration, however strong the moral case for such a
policy might be. Unfortunately Marx and Engels were wrong: the interests of
workers in all countries are not the same.
Fair Trade is not the only alternative to free trade. Dunkley discusses several
forms of ‘Managed Trade’, and also what he terms ‘Self-Reliant Trade’, which offers
‘a chance to be one’s self’, and ‘seeks only to eschew heavy trade dependence for
key capital, consumer, food, energy, cultural or social requirements’ (ibid., p.255).
Short of a comprehensive, binding international agreement on environmental
sustainability, this may be the only way in which respect for nature can be reconciled
with the brutal facts of learning-by-doing and dynamic economies of scale.
Conclusion
Socialists agree that the market, while potentially a good servant, has become a very
poor master. The triumph of neoliberalism, they argue, has been accompanied by
growing inequality (within and between nations), mass unemployment,
macroeconomic instability and unsustainable environmental destruction. In political
terms, it has also undermined democracy and generated a sinister tendency towards
global plutocracy. Socialist policy therefore involves a substantial extension of
public ownership; the restoration of full employment; a commitment to increased
economic, social and political equality; fundamental tax reform; a strong focus on
environmental sustainability; and, last but not least, acceptance of international
responsibility for global justice. This represents a real intellectual alternative to
neoliberalism, but it is too early to say whether it also poses a significant political
threat to the status quo. Much will depend on the consequences for the real economy
of the 2008 global financial crisis. A severe world recession would greatly increase
the political appeal of socialist and social democratic policies like those proposed
here.

Selected References
Arestis, P. (1986) “Post Keynesian Economic Policies: The Case of Sweden”,
Journal of Economic Issues, Volume 20, Number 3, September, pp. 709-23.
Ash, M. et al. (2009) A Progressive Program for Economic Recovery & Financial
Reconstruction. New York: Schwartz Center for Economic Policy Analysis and
Amherst, MA: Political Economy Research Institute.
Blackburn, R. (2002) Banking On Death: The History and Future of Pensions.
London: Verso.
Bowles, S. and Gintis, H. (1998) “Efficient Redistribution: New Rules for Markets,
States, and Communities”, in E. O. Wright (Ed.), Recasting Egalitarianism.
London: Verso, pp. 3-71.
Crosland, C.A.R. (1956) The Future of Socialism. London: Cape.
Davidson, P. (2002) Financial Markets, Money and the Real World. Cheltenham, UK
and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar.
Davidson, P. (2008) “Reforming the World’s International Money”, Real-World
Economics Review, issue no. 48, 6 December, pp. 293-305.
http://www.paecon.net/PAEReview/issue48/Davidson48.pdf (accessed 8 January
2009).
Dunkley, G. (1997) The Free Trade Adventure: The Uruguay Round and
Globalism─A Critique. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.
Howard, M.C. and King, J.E. (2008) The Rise of Neoliberalism in Advanced
Capitalist Economies: A Materialist Analysis. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Kaldor, N. (1955) An Expenditure Tax. London: Allen & Unwin.
King, J.E. (2003a) (Editor) The Elgar Companion to Post Keynesian Economics.
Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar.
King, J.E. (2003b) “Non-Marxian Socialism”, in W. J. Samuels, J.E. Biddle and J. B.
Davis (Editors), A Companion to the History of Economic Thougfht. Oxford, UK
and Malden, MA, USA, Blackwell, pp. 184-200.
King, J.E. (2009) Nicholas Kaldor. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Lichtheim, G. (1970) A Short History of Socialism. London: Fontana, 1983.
Marx, K. and Engels, F. (1848) “The Communist manifesto”, in L. Panitch and C.
Leys (Editors), The Communist Manifesto Now. Socialist Register 1998.
Woodbridge, Suffolk: Merlin Press, pp. 240-68.
Meade, J.E. (1989) Agathotopia: The Economics of Partnership. Aberdeen:
Aberdeen University Press.
Nevile, J. (2003) “Fiscal Policy”, in King 2003a, pp. 149-53.
Nove, A. (1983) The Economics of Feasible Socialism. London: Allen and Unwin.
Palley, T.I. (1998) Plenty of Nothing: The Downsizing of the American Dream and
the Case for Structural Keynesianism. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Palley, T.I. (2004) “Assets-Based Reserve Requirements: Reasserting Domestic
Monetary Control in an Era of Financial Innovation”, Review of Political
Economy, Volume 16, part 1, January, pp. 43-58.

Patomäki, H. (2001) Democratising Globalisation: The Leverage of the Tobin Tax.
London: Zed Books.
Pearce, D. (1993) Economic Values and the Natural World. London: Earthscan.
Pollin, R. et al. (2007) An Employment-Targetted Economic Program for South
Africa. Cheltenham: Elgar.
Pollin, R. et al. (2008) A Measure of Fairness: The Economics of Living Wages and
Minimum Wages in the United States. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Quiggin, J. (2001) “The Fall and Rise of the Global Economy: Finance”, in C. Shell
(Editor), Globalisation: Australian Impacts. Sydney: University of New South
Wales Press, pp. 19-34.
Reynolds, P. (2004) “A Kaleckian Policy Framework”, in Z. Sadowski and A.
Szeworski (Editors), Kalecki’s Economics Today. London and New York:
Routledge, pp. 97-110.
Russell, B. (1896) German Social Democracy. London: Allen and Unwin, 1965.
Russell, B. (1918) Roads to Freedom: Socialism. Anarchism, and Syndicalism.
London: Allen & Unwin.
Sassoon, D. (1996) One Hundred Years of Socialism: The West European Left in the
Twentieth Century. London: I. B. Taurus.
Ussher, L.J. (2009) “International Price Stability, Full Employment and Global
Balances: the Case for a Commodity Reserve Currency”, Review of Political
Economy, forthcoming.
Victor, P.A. and Rosenbluth, G. (2007) “Managing Without Growth”, Ecological
Economics, volume 61, pp. 492-504.
Webb, S. and Webb, B. (1920) A Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth of
Great Britain. London: Longmans, Green.
Winnett, A. (2003) “Environmental Economics”, in King 2003a, pp. 121-6.
Wray, L. R. (1998) Understanding Modern Money: The Key to Full Employment and
Price Stability. Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, US: Elgar.
J.E. King
La Trobe University
Victoria
Australia

